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By Tze Leung Lai1, Shulamith T. Gross2 and David Bo Shen
Stanford University, Baruch College/CUNY and UBS
Probability forecasts of events are routinely used in climate pre-
dictions, in forecasting default probabilities on bank loans or in esti-
mating the probability of a patient’s positive response to treatment.
Scoring rules have long been used to assess the efficacy of the fore-
cast probabilities after observing the occurrence, or nonoccurrence,
of the predicted events. We develop herein a statistical theory for
scoring rules and propose an alternative approach to the evaluation
of probability forecasts. This approach uses loss functions relating the
predicted to the actual probabilities of the events and applies mar-
tingale theory to exploit the temporal structure between the forecast
and the subsequent occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event.
1. Introduction. Probability forecasts of future events are widely used
in diverse fields of application. Oncologists routinely predict the probability
of a cancer patient’s progression-free survival beyond a certain time horizon
[Hari et al. (2009)]. Economists give the probability forecasts of an economic
rebound or a recession by the end of a fiscal year. Banks are required by
regulators assessing their capital requirements to predict periodically the
risk of default of the loans they make. Engineers are routinely called upon
to predict the survival probability of a system or infrastructure beyond five
or ten years; this includes bridges, sewer systems and other structures. Fi-
nally, lawyers also assess the probability of particular trial outcome [Fox and
Birke (2002)] in order to determine whether to go to trial or settle out of
court. This list would not be complete without mentioning the field that
is most advanced in its daily probability predictions, namely meteorology.
In the past 60 years, remarkable advances in forecasting precipitation prob-
abilities, temperatures, and rainfall amounts have been made in terms of
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breadth and accuracy. Murphy and Winkler (1984) provide an illuminating
history of the US National Weather Service’s transition from nonprobabilis-
tic to probability predictions and its development of reliability and accuracy
measures for these probability forecasts. Accuracy assessment is difficult to
carry out directly because it requires comparing a forecaster’s predicted
probabilities with the actual but unknown probabilities of the events under
study. Reliability is measured using “scoring rules,” which are empirical dis-
tance measures between repeated predicted probabilities of an event, such as
having no rain the next day, and indicator variables that take on the value
1 if the predicted event actually occurs, and 0 otherwise; see Gneiting and
Raftery (2007), Gneiting, Balabdaoui and Raftery (2007) and Ranjan and
Gneiting (2010) for recent reviews and developments.
To be more specific, a scoring rule for a sequence of n probability forecasts
pˆi, i = 1, . . . , n, is the average score n
−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi), where Yi = 1 or 0
according to whether the ith event Ai actually occurs or not. An example
is the widely used Brier’s score L(y, pˆ) = (y − pˆ)2 [Brier (1950)]. Noting
that the Yi are related to the actual but unknown probability pi via Yi ∼
Bernoulli(pi), Cox (1958) proposed to evaluate how well the pˆi predict pi by
using the estimates of (β1, β2) in the regression model
logit(pi) = β1 + β2 logit(pˆi)(1.1)
and developed a test of the null hypothesis (β1, β2) = (0,1), which corre-
sponds to perfect prediction. Spiegelhalter (1986) subsequently proposed a
test of the null hypothesisH0 : pˆi = pi for all i= 1, . . . , n, based on a standard-
ized form (under H0) of Brier’s score. A serious limitation of this approach is
the unrealistic benchmark of perfect prediction to formulate the null hypoth-
esis, so significant departures from it are expected when n is large, and they
convey little information on how well the pˆi predict pi. Another limitation
is the implicit assumption that the pˆi are independent random variables,
which clearly is violated since pˆi usually involves previous observations and
predictions.
Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993) have developed a hypothesis test-
ing approach that removes both limitations in testing the validity of a se-
quence of probability forecasts. The forecaster is modeled by a probability
measure under which the conditional probability of the occurrence of Ai
given the σ-field Gi−1 generated by the forecaster’s information set prior to
the occurrence of the event is pii. In this model, the forecaster uses pˆi = pii as
the predicted probability of Ai. As pointed out earlier by Dawid (1982), this
model fits neatly into de Finetti’s (1975) framework in which “the coherent
subjectivist Bayesian can be shown to have a joint probability distribution
over all conceivably observable quantities,” which is represented by the prob-
ability measure Π in the present case. To test if Π is “empirically valid” based
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on the observed outcomes Y1, . . . , Yn, Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993)
consider the null hypothesis H0 that “the sequence of events is generated by
the same joint distribution from which the forecasts are constructed.” Under
this null hypothesis,
∑n
i=1 ξi(Yi − pii), n≥ 1, is a martingale with respect to
the filtration {Gi} when ξi is Gi−1-measurable for all i. Assuming certain
regularity conditions on ξi, they apply the martingale central limit theorem
to show that as n→∞,{
n∑
i=1
ξi(Yi − pii)
}/{ n∑
i=1
ξ2i pii(1− pii)
}1/2
=⇒N(0,1)(1.2)
under H0, where =⇒ denotes convergence in distribution. Since pii = pˆi in
this model of a coherent forecaster, Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993)
have made use of (1.2) to construct various tests of H0. One such test, de-
scribed at the end of their Section 6, involves another probability forecast
pˆ′i, which is “based on no more information” to define ξi, so that a signifi-
cantly large value of the test statistic can be used to reject H0 in favor of
the alternative forecasting model or method.
Hypothesis testing has been extended from testing perfect prediction or
empirical validity of a sequence of probability forecasts to testing equal-
ity of the predictive performance of two forecasts; see Redelmeier, Bloch
and Hickam (1991) who extended Spiegelhalter’s approach mentioned above.
Testing the equality of predictive performance, measured by some loss func-
tion of the predictors and the realized values, of two forecasting models or
methods has attracted much recent interest in the econometrics literature,
which is reviewed in Section 6.2. In this paper we develop a new approach
to statistical inference, which involves confidence intervals rather than sta-
tistical tests of a null hypothesis asserting empirical validity of a forecasting
model or method, or equal predictive performance for two forecasting models
or methods. The essence of our approach is to evaluate probability forecasts
via the average loss Ln = n
−1
∑n
i=1L(pi, pˆi), where pi is the actual but un-
known probability of the occurrence of Ai. When L is linear in pi, L(Yi, pˆi)
is an unbiased estimate of L(pi, pˆi) since E(Yi|pˆi) = pi. We show in Section
2, where an overview of loss functions and scoring rules is also given, that
even for L that is nonlinear in pi there is a “linear equivalent” which carries
the same information as L for comparing different forecasts. In Section 3 we
make use of this insight to construct inferential procedures, such as confi-
dence intervals, for the average loss Ln under certain assumptions and for
comparing the average losses of different forecasts.
Note that we have used E to denote expectation with respect to the
actual probability measure P , under which Ai occurs with probability pi
given the previous history represented by the σ-field Gi−1, and that we have
used Π to denote the probability measure assumed by a coherent Bayesian
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forecaster whose probability of occurrence of Ai given Gi−1 is pii. Because
pii = pˆi for a coherent Bayesian forecaster, Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid
(1993) are able to use (1.2) to test the null hypothesis of empirical validity
of Π in the sense that EΠ(Yi|Gi−1) = pˆi, where EΠ denotes expectation with
respect to the measure Π. Replacing Π by P is much more ambitious, but it
appears impossible to derive the studentized version of the obvious estimate
Lˆn = n
−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi) and its sampling distribution under P to perform
inference on Ln. We address this difficulty in several steps in Section 3.
First we consider in Section 3.1 the case in which L(p, pˆ) is linear in p
and make use of the martingale central limit theorem to prove an analog
of (1.2) with pi in place of pii and ξi = L(1, pˆi) − L(0, pˆi). Whereas pii =
pˆi under Π, the pi associated with P are unknown parameters that need
to be estimated. Postponing their estimation to Section 3.4, we first use
the simple bound pi(1− pi)≤ 1/4 to obtain confidence intervals for Ln by
making use of this analog of (1.2). In Section 3.2 we consider the problem
of comparing two probability forecasts via the difference of their average
losses, and make use of the idea of linear equivalents introduced in Section
2 to remove the assumption of L(p, pˆ) being linear in p when we consider
∆n = n
−1
∑n
i=1{L(pi, pˆ′i)−L(pi, pˆ′′i )}. A variant of ∆n, called Winkler’s skill
score in weather forecasting, is considered in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we
return to the problem of estimating pi(1 − pi). Motivated by applications
in which the forecasts are grouped into “risk buckets” within which the
pi can be regarded as equal, Section 3.4 provides two main results on this
problem. The first is Theorem 3, which gives consistent estimates of the
asymptotic variance of ∆ˆn, or of Lˆn when L(p, pˆ) is linear in p, in the
presence of risk buckets with each bucket of size 2 or more. The second, given
in Theorem 4, shows that in this bucket model it is possible to adjust the
Brier score to obtain a consistent and asymptotically normal estimate of the
average squared error loss Ln = n
−1
∑n
i=1(pi− pˆi)2. Theorem 4 also provides
a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of the adjusted Brier score
when the bucket size is at least 3. In Section 3.5 we develop an analog of
Theorem 3 for the more general setting of “quasi-buckets,” for which the pi
within each bin (quasi-bucket) need not be equal. These quasi-buckets arise
in “reliability diagrams” in the meteorology literature. Theorem 5 shows that
the confidence intervals obtained under an assumed bucket model are still
valid but tend to be conservative if the buckets are actually quasi-buckets.
The proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 are given in Section 5.
Section 4 gives a simulation study of the performance of the proposed
methodology, and some concluding remarks and discussion are given in Sec-
tion 7. In Section 6 we extend the Yi from the case of indicator variables
of events to more general random variables by modifying the arguments in
Section 5, and also show how the methods and results in Sections 3.2 and 3.4
can be used to address related problems in the econometrics literature on
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the expected difference in scores between two forecasts, after a brief review
of that literature that has become a major strand of research in economic
forecasts.
2. Scoring rules and associated loss functions. Instead of defining a scor-
ing rule via L (which associates better forecasts with smaller values of L),
Gneiting and Raftery (2007) and others assign higher scores to better fore-
casts; this is tantamount to using −L instead of L in defining a scoring
rule. More generally, considering p and its forecast pˆ as probability mea-
sures, they call a scoring rule S proper relative to a class P of probability
measures if EpS(Z,p) ≥ EpS(Z, pˆ) for all p and pˆ belonging to P , where
Z is an observed random vector (generated from p) on which scoring is
based. For the development in the subsequent sections, we find it more con-
venient to work with L instead of −L and restrict to Z = (Y1, . . . , Yn) so
that S(Z, (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn)) =−n−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi).
The function L in the scoring rule n−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi) measures the close-
ness of the probability forecast pˆi of event i before the indicator variable Yi
of the event is observed. We can also use L as a loss function in measuring
the accuracy of pˆi as an estimate of the probability pi of event i. Besides
the squared error loss L(p, pˆ) = (p− pˆ)2 used in Brier’s score, another widely
used loss function is the Kullback–Leibler divergence,
L(p, pˆ) = p log(p/pˆ) + (1− p) log[(1− p)/(1− pˆ)],(2.1)
which is closely related to the log score introduced by Good (1952), as shown
below. More general loss functions of this type are the Bregman divergences;
see Section 3.5.4 of Gru¨nwald and Dawid (2004) and Section 2.2 of Gneiting
and Raftery (2007).
We call a loss function L˜(p, pˆ) a linear equivalent of the loss function
L(p, pˆ) if L˜(p, pˆ) is a linear function of p and
L(p, pˆ)− L˜(p, pˆ) does not depend on pˆ.(2.2)
For example, L˜(p, pˆ) =−2ppˆ+ pˆ2 is a linear equivalent of the squared error
loss (p− pˆ)2 used by Brier’s score. A linear equivalent L˜ of the Kullback–
Leibler divergence (2.1) is given by −L˜(p, pˆ) = p log(pˆ) + (1− p) log(1− pˆ).
This is the conditional expected value (given pˆ) of Y log(pˆ)+ (1−Y ) log(1−
pˆ), which is Good’s log score. Since the probability pˆi is determined before
the Bernoulli random variable Yi is observed,
E{L(Yi, pˆi)|pˆi, pi}= piL(1, pˆi) + (1− pi)L(0, pˆi).(2.3)
Therefore the conditional expected loss of a scoring rule L(Y, pˆ) yields a loss
function
L˜(p, pˆ) = {L(1, pˆ)−L(0, pˆ)}p+L(0, pˆ)(2.4)
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that is linear in p. For example, the absolute value scoring rule L(Y, pˆ) =
|Y − pˆ| is associated with L˜(p, pˆ) = p(1− pˆ) + (1− p)pˆ that is linear in each
argument. Using the notation (2.4), the scoring rule L(Y, pˆ) is proper if
L˜(p, p)≤ L˜(p, pˆ) for all p, pˆ ∈ [0,1], and is strictly proper if min0≤pˆ≤1 L˜(p, pˆ)
is uniquely attained at p = pˆ. The scoring rule |Y − pˆ|, therefore, is not
proper; moreover, |p− pˆ| does not have a linear equivalent.
3. A new approach to evaluation of probability forecasts. In this sec-
tion we first consider the evaluation of a sequence of probability forecasts
pˆ1, . . . , pˆn based on the corresponding sequence of indicator variables
Y1, . . . , Yn that denote whether the events actually occur or not. Whereas
the traditional approach to evaluating pˆ= (pˆ1, . . . , pˆn) uses the scoring rule
n−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi), we propose to evaluate pˆ via
Ln = n
−1
n∑
i=1
L(pi, pˆi),(3.1)
where L is a loss function, and pi is the actual probability of the occurrence
of the ith event. Allowing the actual probabilities pi to be generated by
a stochastic system and the forecast pˆk to depend on an information set
Gk−1 that consists of the event and forecast histories and other covariates
before Yk is observed, the conditional distribution of Yi given Gi−1 and pi is
Bernoulli(pi), and therefore
P (Yi = 1|Gi−1, pi) = pi.(3.2)
3.1. Linear case. In view of (3.2), an obvious estimate of the unknown
pi is Yi. Suppose L(p, pˆ) is linear in p, as in the case of linear equivalents of
general loss functions. Combining this linearity property with (3.2) yields
E{L(Yi, pˆi)|Gi−1, pi}= L(pi, pˆi),(3.3)
and therefore L(Yi, pˆi)−L(pi, pˆi) is a martingale difference sequence with re-
spect to {Fi}, where Fi−1 is the σ-field generated by Gi−1 and p1, . . . , pi. Let
di = L(Yi, pˆi)−L(pi, pˆi). Since L(y, pˆ) is linear in y, we can write L(y, pˆ) =
a(pˆ)y+ b(pˆ). Setting y = 0 and y = 1 in this equation yields a(pˆ) = L(1, pˆ)−
L(0, pˆ). Moreover, di = a(pˆi)(Yi − pi). Since Yi|Fi ∼ Bernoulli(pi) and pˆi is
Fi−1-measurable,
E(d2i |Fi−1) = a2(pˆi)pi(1− pi).(3.4)
By (3.4),
∑n
1 E(d
2
i |Fi−1) =
∑n
1{L(1, pˆi) − L(0, pˆi)}2pi(1 − pi) = O(n) a.s.,
and therefore n−1
∑n
i=1 di → 0 a.s. by the martingale strong law
[Williams (1991), Section 12.14] proving Lˆn − Ln → 0 a.s. Moreover, if
n−1
∑n
1 E(d
2
i |Fi−1) = σ2n converges in probability to a nonrandom positive
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constant, then
√
n(Lˆn−Ln)/σn has a limiting standard normal distribution
by Theorem 1 of Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993). Summarizing, we
have the following.
Theorem 1. Suppose L(p, pˆ) is linear in p. Let Lˆn = n
−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi),
and define Ln by (3.1). Letting
σ2n = n
−1
n∑
i=1
{L(1, pˆi)−L(0, pˆi)}2pi(1− pi),(3.5)
assume that σ2n = O(1) with probability 1. Then Lˆn − Ln converges to 0
with probability 1. If σ2n converges in probability to some nonrandom positive
constant, then
√
n(Lˆn−Ln)/σn has a limiting standard normal distribution.
To apply Theorem 1 to statistical inference on Ln, one needs to address
the issue that σ2n involves the unknown pi. As noted in the third paragraph
of Section 1, Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid (1993) have addressed this is-
sue by using pi = EΠ(Yi|Gi−1) under the null hypothesis H0 that assumes
the sequence of events are generated by the probability measure Π. This
approach is related to the earlier work of Dawid (1982), who assumes a
“subjective probability distribution” Π for the events so that Bayesian fore-
casts are given by pˆi = pii = EΠ(Yi|Gi−1). Letting ξt = 1 or 0 according to
whether time t is included in the “test set” to evaluate forecasts, he calls the
test set “admissible” if ξt depends only on Gt−1, and uses martingale theory
to show that(
n∑
i=1
ξiYi −
n∑
i=1
ξipˆi
)/ n∑
i=1
ξi −→ 0 a.s. [Π] on
{
n∑
i=1
ξi =∞
}
.(3.6)
From (3.6), it follows that for any 0 < x < 1, the long-run average of Yi
(under the subjective probability measure) associated with pˆi = x (i.e., ξi =
I{pˆi=x}) is equal to x provided that
∑n
i=1 I{pˆi=x}→∞. Note that Dawid’s
well-calibration theorem (3.6) involves the subjective probability measure
Π. DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) have noted that well-calibrated forecasts
need not reflect the forecaster’s “honest subjective probabilities,” that is,
need not satisfy Dawid’s coherence criterion pˆi = pii. They therefore use a
criterion called “refinement” to compare well-calibrated forecasts.
In this paper we apply Theorem 1 to construct confidence intervals for Ln,
under the actual probability measure P that generates the unknown pi in
(3.5). Whereas substituting pi by Yi in L(pi, pˆi) leads to a consistent estimate
of Ln when L is linear, such substitution gives 0 as an overly optimistic
estimate of pi(1− pi) = Var(Yi|Fi−1). A conservative confidence interval for
Ln can be obtained by replacing pi(1−pi) in (3.5) by its upper bound 1/4. In
Section 3.4, we consider estimation of σ2n and of n
−1
∑n
i=1L(pi, pˆi) when L is
nonlinear in pi, under additional assumptions on how the pi are generated.
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3.2. Application to comparison of probability forecasts. Consider two se-
quences of probability forecasts pˆ′ = (pˆ′1, . . . , pˆ
′
n) and pˆ
′′ = (pˆ′′1 , . . . , pˆ
′′
n) of
p = (p1, . . . , pn). Suppose a loss function L(p, q) is used to evaluate each
forecast, and let L˜(p, q) be its linear equivalent. Since L(p, q)− L˜(p, q) does
not depend on q in view of (2.2), it is a function only of p, which we denote
by d(p). Hence
L(pi, pˆ
′
i)−L(pi, pˆ′′i ) = {L˜(pi, pˆ′i) + d(pi)} − {L˜(pi, pˆ′′i ) + d(pi)}
= L˜(pi, pˆ
′
i)− L˜(pi, pˆ′′i )
is a linear function of pi, and therefore we can estimate ∆n = n
−1
∑n
i=1{L(pi,
pˆ′i)− L(pi, pˆ′′i )} by the difference n−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi)− n−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆ
′
i) of
scores of the two forecasts. Application of Theorem 1 then yields the follow-
ing theorem, whose part (ii) is related to (2.4).
Theorem 2. Let ∆ˆn = n
−1
∑n
i=1{L(Yi, pˆ′i)−L(Yi, pˆ′′i )} and
δi = {L(1, pˆ′i)−L(0, pˆ′i)} − {L(1, pˆ′′i )−L(0, pˆ′′i )},
(3.7)
s2n = n
−1
n∑
i=1
δ2i pi(1− pi).
(i) Suppose L has a linear equivalent. Letting ∆n = n
−1
∑n
i=1{L(pi, pˆ′i)−
L(pi, pˆ
′′
i )}, assume that s2n = O(1) with probability 1. Then ∆ˆn −∆n con-
verges to 0 with probability 1. If furthermore sn converges in probability to
some nonrandom positive constant, then
√
n(∆ˆn −∆n)/sn has a limiting
standard normal distribution.
(ii) Without assuming that L has a linear equivalent, the same conclusion
as in (i) still holds with ∆n = n
−1
∑n
i=1{δipi +L(0, pˆ′i)−L(0, pˆ′′i )}.
3.3. Illustrative applications and skill scores. As an illustration of The-
orem 2, we compare the Brier scores Bk for the k-day ahead forecasts
pˆ
(k)
t ,1≤ k ≤ 7, for Queens, NY, provided by US National Weather Service
from June 8, 2007, to March 31, 2009. Table 1 gives the values of B1 and
Bk −Bk−1 for 2≤ k ≤ 6. Using 1/4 to replace pi(1− pi) in (3.7), we can use
Theorem 2(i) to construct conservative 95% confidence intervals for
∆(k) = n−1
{
n∑
t=1
(pt − pˆ(k)t )2 −
n∑
t=1
(pt − pˆ(k−1)t )2
}
,
in which pt is the actual probability of precipitation on day t. These confi-
dence intervals, which are centered at Bk −Bk−1, are given in Table 1. The
results show significant improvements, by shortening the lead time by one
day, in forecasting precipitation k = 2,3,4,6.
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Table 1
Brier scores B1 and 95% confidence intervals for ∆(k)
B1 ∆(2) ∆(3) ∆(4) ∆(5) ∆(6) ∆(7)
0.125 0.021 0.012 0.020 0.010 0.015 0.007
±0.010 ±0.011 ±0.012 ±0.011 ±0.011 ±0.010
For another application of Theorem 2, we consider Winkler’s (1994) skill
score. To evaluate weather forecasts, a skill score that is commonly used
is the percentage improvement in average score over that provided by cli-
matology, denoted by pˆci and considered as an “unskilled” forecaster, that
is,
Sn =
{
n−1
n∑
i=1
L(Yi, pˆ
c
i)− n−1
n∑
i=1
L(Yi, pˆi)
}/
n−1
n∑
i=1
L(Yi, pˆ
c
i).(3.8)
Climatology refers to the historic relative frequency, also called the base
rate, of precipitation; we can take it to be pˆci = (M +1)
−1
∑0
t=−M Yt. Noting
that (3.8) is not a proper score although it is intuitively appealing, Winkler
(1994) proposed to replace the average climatology score in the denominator
of (3.8) by individual weights l(pˆi, pˆ
c
i), that is,
Wn = n
−1
n∑
i=1
{L(Yi, pˆi)−L(Yi, pˆci )}/l(pˆi, pˆci),(3.9)
where l(p, c) = {L(1, p) − L(1, c)}I{p≥c} + {L(0, p) − L(0, c)}I{p<c}. Theo-
rem 2(i) can be readily extended to show that Winkler’s score Wn is a
consistent estimate of
wn = n
−1
n∑
i=1
{L(pi, pˆi)−L(pi, pˆci)}/l(pˆi, pˆci )(3.10)
and that
√
n(Wn − wn)/s˜n has a limiting standard normal distribution,
where
s˜2n = n
−1
n∑
i=1
δ2i pi(1− pi)/l2(pˆi, pˆci ).(3.11)
Winkler (1994) used the score (3.9), in which L(p, pˆ) = (p− pˆ)2, to evaluate
precipitation probability forecasts, with a 12- to 24-hour lead time, given by
the US National Weather Service for 20 cities in the period between April
1966 and September 1983. Besides the score (3.9), he also computed the
Brier score and the skill score (3.8) of these forecasts and found that both
the Brier and skill scores have high correlations (0.87 and 0.76) whereas
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Fig. 1. The Winkler and skill scores versus climatology.
(3.9) has a much lower correlation 0.44 with average climatology, suggesting
that (3.9) provides a better reflection of the “skill” of the forecasts over
an unskilled forecasting rule (based on historic relative frequency). Instead
of using correlation coefficients, we performed a more detailed analysis of
Winkler’s and skill scores to evaluate the one-day ahead probability forecasts
of precipitation for six cities: Las Vegas, NV; Phoenix, AZ; Albuquerque,
NM; Queens, NY; Boston, MA; and Portland, OR (listed in increasing order
of relative frequency of precipitation), during the period January 1, 2005,
to December 31, 2009. The period January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2004,
is used to obtain the past three years’ climatology, which is used as the
reference unskilled score in the calculation of the skill score and Winkler’s
score (3.9). The left panel of Figure 1 plots Winkler’s score against the
relative precipitation frequency taken from the period January 1, 2005, to
December 31, 2009, which is simply the percentage of days with rain during
that period and represents the climatology in (3.8). The dashed line in the
right panel of Figure 1 represents linear regression of the skill scores (3.8)
on climatology and has a markedly positive slope of 0.95. In contrast, the
regression line of Winkler’s scores on climatology, shown in the left panel of
Figure 1, is relatively flat and has slope 0.12. Unlike skill scores, Winkler’s
scores are proper and provide consistent estimates of the average loss (3.10)
involving the actual daily precipitation probabilities pi for each city during
the evaluation period. The vertical bar centered at the dot (representing
Winkler’s score) for each city is a 95% confidence interval for (3.10), using a
conservative estimate of (3.11) that replaces pi(1−pi) by 1/4. The confidence
intervals are considerably longer for cities whose relative frequencies pˆci of
precipitation fall below 0.1 because δ2i /l
2(pˆi, pˆ
c
i) tends to be substantially
larger when pˆci is small.
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3.4. Risk buckets and quadratic loss functions. Both (3.5) and (3.7) in-
volve pi(1−pi), which is the variance of the Bernoulli random variable Yi. It
is not possible to estimate this variance based on a single observation unless
there is some statistical structure on the pi to make (3.5) or (3.7) estimable,
and a conservative approach in the absence of such structure is to use the
upper bound 1/4 for pi(1 − pi) in (3.5) or (3.7), as noted in Section 3.1.
One such structure is that the pi can be grouped into buckets within which
they have the same value, as in risk assessment of a bank’s retail loans (e.g.,
mortgages, automobile loans and personal loans), for which the obligors are
grouped into risk buckets within which they can be regarded as having the
same risk (or more precisely, the same probability of default on their loans).
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [(2006), page 91]
each bank has to use at least seven risk buckets for borrowers who have not
defaulted and at least one for those who have defaulted previously at the
time of loan application.
A bucket model for risk assessment involves multivariate forecasts for
events k,1 ≤ k ≤Kt, at a given time t. Thus, identifying the index i with
(t, k), one has a vector of probability forecasts (pˆt,1, . . . , pˆt,Kt) at time t− 1
for the occurrences of Kt events at time t; Kt = 0 if no forecast is made at
time t− 1. The information set can then be expressed as Gt−1 that consists
of event and forecast histories and other covariates up to time t − 1, and
therefore conditional on Gt−1 and pt,1, . . . , pt,Kt , the events at time t can be
regarded as the outcomes of Kt independent Bernoulli trials with respective
probabilities pt,1, . . . , pt,Kt . The bucket model assumes that, conditional on
Gt−1 and pt,1, . . . , pt,Kt , events in the same bucket at time t have the same
probability of occurrence. That is, the pt,k are equal for all k belonging to
the same bucket. Let Jt be the number of buckets at time t and nj,t be
the size of the jth bucket, 1≤ j ≤ Jt, so that n=
∑T
t=1
∑Jt
j=1nj,t. Then the
common pt,k of the jth bucket at time t, denoted by pt(j), can be estimated
by the relative frequency Y¯t(j) = n
−1
j,t
∑
i∈Ij,t
Yi, where Ij,t denotes the index
set for the bucket. This in turn yields an unbiased estimate
vˆt(j) = nj,tY¯t(j)(1− Y¯t(j))/(nj,t− 1)(3.12)
of pi(1 − pi) for i ∈ Ij,t, and we can replace pi(1 − pi) in (3.5) or (3.7) by
vˆt(j) for i ∈ Ij,t so that the results of Theorems 1 or 2 still hold with these
estimates of the asymptotic variance, as shown in the following.
Theorem 3. Using the same notation as in the preceding paragraph,
suppose nj,t ≥ 2 for 1≤ j ≤ Jt and define vˆt(j) by (3.12).
(i) Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 1, define
σˆ2n = n
−1
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
{L(1, pˆi)−L(0, pˆi)}2vˆt(j).
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Then σˆ2n − σ2n converges to 0 with probability 1.
(ii) Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 2, sˆ2n − s2n converges to
0 with probability 1, where sˆ2n = n
−1
∑T
t=1
∑Jt
j=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
δ2i vˆt(j).
Proof. Let Ft−1 be the σ-field generated by Gt−1 and ps,1, . . . , ps,Ks for
s≤ t. Note that vˆt(j) =
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi − Y¯t(j))2/(nj,t− 1) and that
E(vˆt(j)|Ft−1) = pt(j)(1− pt(j)),(3.13)
which is the variance of Yi associated with Ij,t. Therefore
Jt∑
j=1
{vˆt(j)− pt(j)(1− pt(j))}
{∑
i∈Ij,t
[L(1, pˆi)−L(0, pˆi)]2
}
is a martingale difference sequence with respect to {Ft}. Hence we can apply
the martingale strong law as in the proof of Theorem 1 to show that σˆ2n−σ2n
converges a.s., and the same argument also applies to sˆ2n − s2n. 
The preceding proof also shows that for the squared error loss L(p, pˆ) =
(p − pˆ)2, we can estimate (3.1) in the bucket model by the adjusted Brier
score
Lˆn − n−1
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
nj,tvˆt(j),(3.14)
since Lˆn = n
−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi) is a consistent estimate of the linear equiva-
lent n−1
∑n
i=1(pˆ
2
i − 2pipˆi + pi), and n−1
∑T
t=1
∑Jt
j=1nj,tvˆt(j) is a consistent
estimate of n−1
∑n
i=1 pi(1− pi). Consistency of an estimate lˆn of ln means
that lˆn− ln converges to 0 in probability as n→∞. Moreover, the following
theorem shows that
√
n(Lˆn − n−1
∑T
t=1
∑Jt
j=1 nj,tvˆt(j)− Ln) has a limiting
normal distribution in the bucket model and can be studentized to give a
limiting standard normal distribution. Its proof is given in Section 5.
Theorem 4. Suppose nj,t ≥ 2 for 1 ≤ j ≤ Jt. Letting L(p, pˆ) = (p −
pˆ)2, define Ln by (3.1) and the adjusted Brier score by (3.14). Let vt(j) =
pt(j)(1− pt(j)),
β2n = n
−1
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
{
vt(j)
∑
i∈Ij,t
(1− 2pˆi)2
− 2vt(j)(1− 2pt(j))
∑
i∈Ij,t
(1− 2pˆi)(3.15)
+ nj,tvt(j)(1− 4vt(j)) + 2nj,tv2t (j)/(nj,t − 1)
}
.
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If βn converges in probability to some nonrandom positive constant, then√
n(Lˆn − n−1
∑T
t=1
∑Jt
j=1nj,tvˆt(j)−Ln)/βn has a limiting standard normal
distribution. Moreover, if nj ≥ 3 for all 1≤ j ≤ Jt, then βˆn − βn converges
to 0 with probability 1, where
βˆ2n =
1
n
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
{
vˆt(j)
∑
i∈Ij,t
(1− 2pˆi)2
− 2n
2
j,t
(nj,t− 1)3
[∑
i∈Ij,t
(1− 2pˆi)
][∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi − Y¯t(j))3
]
(3.16)
+
4nj,t(nj,t− 1)
(nj,t− 2)2
×
∑
i∈Ij,t
[
1
2(nj,t− 1)
∑
k∈Ij,t,k 6=i
(Yi − Yk)2 − vˆt(j)
]2}
.
3.5. Quasi-buckets and reliability diagrams. When the actual pt,i in a
bin with index set Ij,t are not the same for all i ∈ Ij,t, we call the bin a
“quasi-bucket.” These quasi-buckets are the basic components of reliability
diagrams that are widely used as graphical tools to evaluate probability fore-
casts. In his description of reliability diagrams, Wilks [(2005), Sections 7.1.2,
7.1.3] notes that reliability, or calibration, relates the forecast to the aver-
age observation, “for specific values of (i.e., conditional on) the forecast.” A
widely used approach to “verification” of forecasts in meteorology is to group
the forecasts pˆi into bins so that “they are rounded operationally to a finite
set of values,” denoted by pˆ(1), . . . , pˆ(J). Corresponding to each pˆ(j) is a set
of observations Yi, i ∈ Ij , taking the values 0 and 1, where Ij = {i : pˆi = pˆ(j)}.
The reliability diagram plots Y¯ (j) = (
∑
i∈Ij
Yi)/nj versus pˆ(j), where nj is
the size of Ij ; see Figure 3 in Section 4. Statistical inference for reliability
diagrams has been developed in the meteorology literature under the as-
sumption of “independence and stationarity,” that is, that (pˆi, Yi) are i.i.d.
samples from a bivariate distribution of forecast and observation; see Wilks
[(2005), Section 7.9.3] and Bro¨cker and Smith (2007). Under this assump-
tion, the index sets Ij define a bucket model and a (1−α)-level confidence
interval for the common mean p(j) of the Yi for i ∈ Ij is
Y¯ (j)± z1−α/2{Y¯ (j)(1− Y¯ (j))/nj}1/2,(3.17)
where zq is the qth quantile of the standard normal distribution.
The assumption of i.i.d. forecast-observation pairs is clearly violated in
weather forecasting, and this has led to the concern that the confidence
intervals given by (3.17) “are possibly too narrow” [Wilks (2005), page 331].
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The temporal dependence between the forecast-observation pairs can be
handled by incorporating time as in Section 3.4. To be specific, let pˆt,k, k ≤
Kt, be the probability forecasts, at time t− 1, of events in the next period.
We divide the set {pˆt,k :k ≤Kt,1 ≤ t≤ T} into bins B1, . . . ,BJ , which are
typically disjoint sub-intervals of [0,1]. Let
Ij,t = {k : pˆt,k ∈Bj},
Y¯t(j) =
∑
i∈Ij,t
Yi/nj,t,(3.18)
Y¯ (j) =
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
Yi/nj,
where nj,t is the cardinality of Ij,t and nj =
∑T
t=1 nj,t. Note that nj,t and
Y¯t(j) have already been introduced in Section 3.4 and that Y¯ (j) is the
average of the observations in the jth bin, as in (3.17). In the absence of any
assumption on pi for i ∈ Ij,t, these index sets define quasi-buckets instead of
buckets. We can extend the arguments of Section 3.4 to the general case that
makes no assumptions on the pi and thereby derive the statistical properties
of Y¯ (j) without the restrictive assumption of i.i.d. (pˆi, Yi). With the same
notation as in Section 3.4, note that the index sets Ij,t defined in (3.18) are
Gt−1-measurable since the pˆt,k are Gt−1-measurable.
Whereas Y¯t(j) is used to estimate the common value of pi for i ∈ Ij,t and
vˆt(j), defined in (3.12), is used to estimate the common value of pi(1− pi)
in Section 3.4, the pi in quasi-buckets need no longer be equal. Replacing Yi
by pi in Y¯ (j) and taking a weighted average of vˆt(j) over t, we obtain
p¯(j) =
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
pi
nj
, vˆ(j) =
∑T
t=1 nj,tvˆt(j)
nj
.(3.19)
Instead of (3.17) that is based on overly strong assumptions, we propose to
use
Y¯ (j)± z1−α/2{vˆ(j)/nj}1/2(3.20)
as a (1 − α)-level confidence interval for p¯(j). Part (iii) of the following
theorem, whose proof is given in Section 5, shows that the confidence interval
tends to be conservative. Parts (i) and (ii) modify the estimates in Theorem
3 for σ2n and s
2
n when the pi in the assumed buckets turn out to be unequal.
Theorem 5. With the same notation as in Theorem 3, remove the
assumption that pi are all equal for i ∈ Ij,t but assume that Ij,t is Gt−1-
measurable for 1≤ j ≤ Jt.
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(i) Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, let
σ˜2n =
1
n
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
{L(1, pˆi)−L(0, pˆi)}2(Yi− Y¯t(j))2 nj,t
nj,t− 1 .(3.21)
Then σ˜2n ≥ σ2n + o(1) a.s. Moreover, if the pi are equal for all i ∈ Ij,t and
1≤ j ≤ Jt, then σ˜2n − σ2n converges to 0 a.s.
(ii) Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, s˜2n ≥ s2n + o(1) a.s., where
s˜2n =
1
n
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
δ2i (Yi − Y¯t(j))2
nj,t
nj,t− 1 .(3.22)
(iii) Suppose Jt = J for all t = 1, . . . , T . For 1 ≤ j ≤ J , define Y¯ (j) by
(3.18), and p¯(j) and vˆ(j) by (3.19), in which nj =
∑T
t=1 nj,t. Let
v(j) = n−1j
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
pi(1− pi),(3.23)
and let n = n1 + · · ·+ nJ be the total sample size. Suppose nj/n and v(j)
converge in probability to nonrandom positive constants as n→∞. Then
(nj/v(j))
1/2{Y¯ (j) − p¯(j)} has a limiting standard normal distribution as
n→∞. Moreover, vˆ(j)≥ v(j) + op(1) and equality holds if the pi are equal
for all i ∈ Ij,t.
Note that the numerator of (3.12) is equal to
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi − Y¯t(j))2. The
estimate (3.21) or (3.22) essentially replaces this sum by a weighted sum,
using the weights associated with pi(1− pi) in the sum (3.5) or (3.7) that
defines σ2n or s
2
n. The term nj,t/(nj,t− 1) in (3.21) and (3.22) corresponds to
the bias correction factor in the sample variance (3.12). Theorem 5 shows
that (3.21) [or (3.22)] is still a consistent estimator of σ2n (or s
2
n) if the bucket
model holds, and that it tends to over-estimate σ2n (or s
2
n) otherwise, erring
only on the conservative side.
4. Simulation studies. The risk buckets in Section 3.4 and the forecasts
are usually based on covariates. In this section we consider T = 2 in the case
of discrete covariates so that there are Jt buckets of various sizes for n =∑2
t=1
∑Jt
j=1nj,t = 300 probability forecasts prior to observing the indicator
variables Y1, . . . , Yn of the events. We use the Brier score and its associated
loss function L(p, pˆ) = (p − pˆ)2 to evaluate the probability forecasts and
study by simulations the adequacy of the estimates βˆ2n and sˆ
2
n and their use
in the normal approximations. The simulation study covers four scenarios
and involves 1,000 simulation runs for each scenario. Scenario 1 considers the
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Brier score of a forecasting rule, while Scenarios 2–4 consider the difference
of Brier scores of two forecasts. The bucket sizes and how the pi and pˆi are
generated in each scenario are described as follows.
Scenario 1. There are ten buckets of size 15 each for each period.
The common values pt(j) in the buckets are 0.1, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5,
0.65, 0.7, 0.75 and 0.8, respectively, for t = 1,2. The probability forecast
pˆt,k,1≤ k ≤ 150, made at time t− 1, uses covariate information to identify
the bucket j associated with the kth event at time t and predicts that it
occurs with probability Y¯t−1(j), assuming that 150 indicator variables at
time 0 are also observed so that Y¯0(j) is available.
Scenario 2. For each period, there are nine buckets, three of which
have size 2 and two of which have size 5; the other bucket sizes are 24, 30,
35 and 45 (one bucket for each size). The bucket probabilities pt(j) are i.i.d.
random variables generated from Uniform (0,1). The forecast pˆt,k is the same
as that in Scenario 1, and there is another forecast pˆ′t,k = Y¯t−1 that ignores
covariate information.
Scenario 3. For each period, there are five buckets of size 30 each,
and pt(j) =−0.1+ j/5 for j = 1, . . . ,5. The two forecasts are the same as in
Scenario 2.
Scenario 4. This is the same as Scenario 3, except that pi is uniformly
distributed on [(j − 1)/5, j/5] for i ∈ Ij,t, that is, the bucket assumption is
only approximately correct.
Figure 2 gives the Q–Q plots of
√
n(Lˆn−n−1
∑2
t=1
∑Jt
j=1nj,tvˆt(j)−Ln)/βˆn
for Scenario 1 and
√
n(∆ˆn−∆n)/sˆn for Scenarios 2–4. Despite the deviation
from the assumed bucket model in Scenario 4, the Q–Q plot does not deviate
much from the 45◦ line. Table 2 gives the means and 5-number summaries
(minimum, maximum, median, 1st and 3rd quartiles) of sˆn/sn for Scenarios
2–4 and βˆn/βn for Scenario 1.
To illustrate the reliability diagram and the associated confidence intervals
(3.20) in Section 3.5, we use one of the simulated data sets in Scenario 4 to
construct the reliability diagram for the forecasts pˆt,k (t= 1,2;k = 1, . . . ,5),
grouping the forecasts over time in the bins [(j − 1)/5, j/5], j = 1, . . . ,5,
that are natural for this scenario. The diagram is given in Figure 3. Table
3 gives the means, standard deviations (SD), and 5-number summaries of
Y¯ (j), p¯(j), vˆ(j) and v(j) defined in (3.18), (3.19) and (3.23) based on the
1,000 simulations. In particular, it shows that vˆ(j) tends to over-estimate
v(j). Moreover, the probability of coverage of the 95% interval (3.20) for
EVALUATING PROBABILITY FORECASTS 17
Fig. 2. Q–Q plots for Scenarios 1–4.
Table 2
Simulation results for βˆn/βn (Scenario 1) and sˆn/sn
Min. 1st qrt. Median 3rd qrt. Max. Mean
Scenario 1 0.6397 1.0840 1.1810 1.2830 1.6520 1.1780
Scenario 2 0.7442 0.9647 1.0060 1.0490 1.1970 1.0050
Scenario 3 0.7586 0.9506 1.0060 1.0570 1.2070 1.0010
Scenario 4 0.7420 0.9661 1.0180 1.0730 1.2240 1.0160
p¯(j), evaluated by averaging over the 1,000 simulations, is 0.949, 0.947, 0.944,
0.940 and 0.928, for j = 1, . . . ,5, respectively, suggesting that the results of
Theorem 5 still apply even for moderate sample sizes. We do not consider
the second forecast pˆ′t,k = Y¯t−1 to illustrate reliability diagrams because by
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Fig. 3. Reliability diagram for the forecasts pˆt,k. At the midpoint of each of the five bins
[(j−1)/5, j/5], j = 1, . . . ,5, a 95% confidence interval, centered at Y¯ (j), for p¯(j) is shown;
only the upper (or lower) half of the interval is shown at j = 1 (or 5) to keep the range of
the vertical axis between 0.1 and 0.9.
Table 3
Simulation results for p¯(j), Y¯ (j), v(j) and vˆ(j)
Min 1st qrt. Median 3rd qrt. Max Mean SD
p¯(1) 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.168 0.234 0.121 0.033
Y¯ (1) 0.017 0.083 0.117 0.156 0.350 0.123 0.051
v(1) 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.127 0.167 0.100 0.020
vˆ(1) 0.067 0.089 0.106 0.132 0.233 0.106 0.037
p¯(2) 0.101 0.300 0.300 0.355 0.515 0.320 0.049
Y¯ (2) 0.050 0.267 0.317 0.378 0.633 0.319 0.089
v(2) 0.087 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.247 0.209 0.015
vˆ(2) 0.048 0.208 0.221 0.239 0.259 0.213 0.034
p¯(3) 0.300 0.515 0.515 0.577 0.701 0.527 0.058
Y¯ (3) 0.217 0.467 0.533 0.589 0.833 0.529 0.096
v(3) 0.206 0.233 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.239 0.011
vˆ(3) 0.144 0.240 0.249 0.254 0.259 0.244 0.015
p¯(4) 0.515 0.659 0.701 0.701 0.906 0.690 0.052
Y¯ (4) 0.367 0.633 0.689 0.750 1.000 0.687 0.090
v(4) 0.082 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.247 0.204 0.021
vˆ(4) 0.063 0.207 0.217 0.236 0.259 0.211 0.035
p¯(5) 0.769 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.895 0.026
Y¯ (5) 0.733 0.867 0.900 0.933 1.000 0.892 0.049
v(5) 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.164 0.088 0.016
vˆ(5) 0.077 0.084 0.093 0.120 0.202 0.096 0.037
the central limit theorem, the pˆ′t,k are concentrated around 0.5 and nearly
all of the forecasts lie in the bin [0.4,0.6].
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5. Proofs of Theorems 4 and 5. Re-labeling the Yi as Yt,1, . . . , Yt,Kt , we
note that conditional on Ft−1,{Yt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ Kt} is a set of independent
Bernoulli random variables with respective parameters pt,1, . . . , pt,Kt . This
point, which has been noted in the second paragraph of Section 3.4 and
will be discussed further in Section 7, explains why we can first derive the
result for the special case in which Yt,k are independent and then modify the
argument by conditioning on Ft−1 and appealing to martingale theory. As
an illustration, note that if Yi, i ∈ Ij,t, are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables
with common parameter pt(j), then vˆt(j) defined in (3.12) is an unbiased
estimate of pt(j)(1− pt(j)) and one can use the classical strong law of large
numbers to derive the result. The proof of Theorem 3 basically shows that
vˆt(j) is “conditionally unbiased” given Ft−1 in the sense of (3.13) and then
uses the martingale strong law to derive the result. To prove Theorem 4, we
extend this idea to obtain a conditionally unbiased estimate of Var(vˆt(j))
by first considering the i.i.d. case: let X1, . . . ,Xm be i.i.d. random variables.
As is well known, the sample variance vˆ =
∑m
i=1(Xi − X¯)2/(m− 1) is a U -
statistic of order 2, with kernel h(Xi,Xk) = (Xi −Xk)2/2. Arvesen (1969)
has shown that an unbiased estimate of the variance of the U -statistic is the
jackknife estimate
4(m− 1)
m(m− 2)2
m∑
i=1
{
1
m− 1
m∑
k=1
k 6=i
h(Xi,Xk)− vˆ
}2
.(5.1)
Proof of Theorem 4. Use L(p, pˆ) = (p− pˆ)2 to express n{Lˆn−n−1×∑T
t=1
∑Jt
j=1nj,tvˆt(j)−Ln} as
T∑
t=1
Kt∑
k=1
(1− 2pˆt,k)(Yt,k − pt,k)−
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
nj,t[vˆt(j)− pt(j)(1− pt(j))],(5.2)
which is the difference of two martingales and is therefore a martingale. To
compute the conditional variance (or predictable variation) of (5.2), we can
use the “angle bracket” notation and formulas for predictable variation and
covariation [Williams (1991), Section 12.12] to obtain〈
T∑
t=1
Kt∑
k=1
(1− 2pˆt,k)(Yt,k − pt,k)
〉
=
T∑
t=1
Kt∑
k=1
(1− 2pˆt,k)2E((Yt,k − pt,k)2|Ft−1)(5.3)
=
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
(∑
i∈Ij,t
(1− 2pˆi)2
)
pt(j)(1− pt(j)),
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T∑
t=1
Kt∑
k=1
(1− 2pˆt,k)(Yt,k − pt,k),
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
nj,t[vˆt(j)− pt(j)(1− pt(j))]
〉
(5.4)
=
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
[∑
i∈Ij,t
(1− 2pˆi)
]
pt(j)(1− pt(j))(1− 2pt(j)),
〈
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
nj,t[vˆt(j)− pt(j)(1− pt(j))]
〉
=
T∑
t=1
Jt∑
j=1
{nj,tpt(j)(1− pt(j))[1− 4pt(j)(1− pt(j))](5.5)
+ 2nj,tp
2
t (j)(1− pt(j))2/(nj,t− 1)}.
Combining (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) yields formula (3.15) for the conditional
variance of (5.2) divided by n.
In view of (3.13), vˆt(j) is a conditionally unbiased estimate of pt(j)(1−
pt(j)) given Ft−1. If Y ∼ Bernoulli(pi), then E(Y − p)3 = p(1− p)(1− 2p).
Hence a conditionally unbiased estimate of pt(j)(1− pt(j))(1− 2pt(j)) given
Ft−1 is
[n2j,t/(nj,t− 1)3]
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi− Y¯t(j))3,(5.6)
analogous to (3.13). Replacing pt(j)(1− pt(j))(1− 2pt(j)) in (5.4) by (5.6)
and multiplying (5.4) by −2/n gives the second summand of (3.16). Note
that the first summand of (3.16) corresponds to replacing pt(j)(1 − pt(j))
in (5.3) by vˆt(j). The last summand of (3.16) corresponds to using the
jackknife estimate (5.1) to estimate the conditional variance of vˆt(j) given
Ft−1. Since {Yi, i ∈ Ij,t} is a set of i.i.d. random variables conditional on
Ft−1, the jackknife estimate is conditionally unbiased given Ft−1; see the
paragraph preceding the proof of this theorem. The rest of the argument is
similar to that of Theorem 3. 
Proof of Theorem 5. We first prove (iii). Using the notation in the
paragraph preceding the proof of Theorem 4, recall that conditional on Ft−1,
the Yt,k are independent Bernoulli(pt,k) random variables. Since Ij,t is Ft−1-
measurable, it follows that
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi−pi) is a martingale difference sequence
with respect to {Ft} and E{[
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi − pi)]2|Ft−1} =
∑
i∈Ij,t
pi(1 − pi).
Since n−1
∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
pi(1 − pi) converges in probability to a nonrandom
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positive constant as n→∞, we can apply the martingale central limit the-
orem as in the proof of Theorem 1 to conclude that∑T
t=1
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi − pi)
{∑Tt=1∑i∈Ij,t pi(1− pi)}1/2 =⇒N(0,1)
proving the first part of (iii).
To prove the second part of (iii), and also (i) and (ii), we first show that
for any nonnegative Ft−1-measurable random variables wt,1, . . . ,wt,Kt ,
E
{∑
k∈Ij,t
wt,k(Yt,k − Y¯t(j))2|Ft−1
}
(5.7)
≥
∑
k∈Ij,t
(1− n−1j,t )wt,kpt,k(1− pt,k),
in which
∑
k∈Ij,t
means
∑
i∈Ij,t
when i is represented as (t, k); see the second
paragraph of Section 3.4. Define Y¯t(j), Y¯ (j) and p¯(j) as in (3.18) and (3.19),
and let p¯t(j) = (
∑
k∈Ij,t
pt,k)/nj,t. From the decomposition
Yt,k − Y¯t(j) = (Yt,k − pt,k) + (pt,k − p¯t(j)) + (p¯t(j)− Y¯t(j)),(5.8)
it follows that the left-hand side of (5.7) is equal to∑
k∈Ij,t
wt,kE[(Yt,k − pt,k)2|Ft−1] +
∑
k∈Ij,t
wt,k(pt,k − p¯t(j))2
+
∑
k∈Ij,t
wt,kE[(Y¯t(j)− p¯t(j))2|Ft−1](5.9)
− 2E
[
(Y¯t(j)− p¯t(j))
∑
k∈Ij,t
wt,k(Yt,k − pt,k)
]
by using the fact that conditional on Ft−1 the Yt,k are independent Bernoulli.
Since Y¯t(j)− p¯t(j) =
∑
k∈It,j
(Yt,k − pt,k)/nj,t, we can use this fact again to
combine the last two terms of (5.9) into
−
∑
k∈Ij,t
(wt,k/nj,t)E[(Yt,k − pt,k)2|Ft−1].(5.10)
Since wt,k ≥ 0, we can drop the second term in (5.9) to obtain (5.7) from
(5.9) and (5.10). Moreover, since this term is actually 0 when the pt,k are
all equal for k ∈ Ij,t, equality holds in (5.7) in this case.
Let wt,k = nj,t/(nj,t − 1). Then (5.7) reduces to
E(nj,tvˆt(j)|Ft−1)≥
∑
k∈Ij,t
pt,k(1− pt,k).(5.11)
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Under the assumptions of part (iii) of the theorem, we can apply the mar-
tingale strong law to obtain
T∑
t=1
{nj,tvˆt(j)−E(nj,tvˆt(j)|Ft−1)}/nj −→ 0 a.s. on {nj →∞}.(5.12)
Combining (5.11) with (5.12) yields vˆ(j)≥ v(j) + op(1), with equality when
the pt,k are all equal for k ∈ Ij,t.
To prove part (i) of the theorem, put wt,k = {L(1, pˆt,k)−L(0, pˆt,k)}2nj,t/
(nj,t − 1) in (5.7) and then use the same argument as in the preceding
paragraph. The proof of part (ii) is similar. 
6. Extensions and connections to forecast comparison in econometrics.
Our new approach to evaluating probability forecasts in Section 3 is based on
consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the average loss
n−1
∑n
i=1L(pi, pˆi), without any assumptions on how the observed indicator
variables Yi and their forecasts pˆi are generated. The key to this approach is
that conditional on Fi−1, Yi is Bernoulli(pi), and therefore martingale argu-
ments can be used to derive the results in Section 3. In Section 6.1 we show
how this approach can be extended to more general random variables Yi. As
shown in (2.3), when Yi is an indicator variable, the conditional expectation
of the score L(Yi, pˆi) given Fi−1 is a linear function of pi, but this does not
extend to more general random variables Yi. In Section 6.2 we review the
recent econometrics literature on testing the equality of the expected scores
of two forecasts and discuss an alternative approach to statistical inference
on the expected difference in average scores of two forecasts.
6.1. Extensions to general predictands. A characteristic of (pˆi, Yi) in prob-
ability forecasting is that E(Yi|Fi−1) = pi while the Gi−1-measurable forecast
pˆi is an estimate of pi. The theorems in Section 3 and their martingale proofs
in Section 5 can be easily extended to general random variables Yi when the
loss function is of the form L(µi, µˆi), where µi = E(Yi|Fi−1) and µˆi is a
forecast of Yi given Fi−1. Although Yi|Fi−1 ∼ Bernoulli(pi) in Section 3, no
parametric assumptions are actually needed when we use a loss function of
the form L(µi, µˆi). As in (2.2), such loss function is said to have a linear
equivalent L˜ if
L˜(y, yˆ) is linear in y and L(y, yˆ)− L˜(y, yˆ) does not depend on yˆ.(6.1)
The bucket model in Section 3.4 can be extended so that Yt,k|Ft−1 have the
same mean and variance for all (t, k) belonging to the same bucket. In place
of (3.12), we now use
vˆt(j) =
∑
i∈Ij,t
(Yi − Y¯t(j))2/(nj,t − 1)(6.2)
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as an unbiased estimate of the common conditional variance of Yi given Fi−1
for i= (t, k) ∈ Ij,t, using the same notation as that in the proof of Theorem
4. While the extension of Theorem 3 only needs the first two moments of
Yt,k|Ft−1 to be equal for all (t, k) belonging to the same bucket, Theorem 4
can also be extended by assuming the first four moments of Yt,k|Ft−1 to be
equal for all (t, k) belonging to the same bucket, by using Arvesen’s (1969)
jackknife estimate of the variance of a U -statistic.
Clearly (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10) also hold with pt,k and p¯t(j) replaced by
µt,k and µ¯t(k), so Theorem 5 can likewise be extended to quasi-buckets
and reliability diagrams for the predicted means µˆt,k. For sample means in
the case of independent observations within each bucket, this extension of
Theorem 5 can be viewed as a corollary of the analysis of variance. In fact,
the proof of Theorem 5 uses martingale arguments and conditioning to allow
dependent observations in each (quasi-)bucket.
6.2. Inference on expected difference in average scores of two forecasts.
When the Yi are indicator variables of events, Theorem 2(ii) establishes
asymptotic normality for the difference ∆ˆn = n
−1
∑n
i=1{L(Yi, pˆ′i)−L(Yi, pˆ′′i )}
in average scores between two forecasts, from which one can perform infer-
ence on
∆n = n
−1
n∑
i=1
E{L(Yi, pˆ′i)−L(Yi, pˆ′′i )|Fi−1}
(6.3)
= n−1
n∑
i=1
{δipi +L(0, pˆ′i)−L(0, pˆ′′i )},
where δi = {L(1, pˆ′i)−L(0, pˆ′i)}−{L(1, pˆ′′i )−L(0, pˆ′′i )}. This simplicity, how-
ever, does not extend to general Yi.
Proper scoring rules for probability forecasts of categorical and contin-
uous variables Yi have been an active area of research; see the review by
Gneiting and Raftery (2007). Another active area of research is related to
the extension of ∆ˆn to general Yi in the econometrics literature, beginning
with the seminal paper of Diebold and Mariano (1995). They consider the
usual forecast errors et := Yt − Yˆt|t−1 in time series analysis, where Yˆt|t−1 is
the one-step ahead forecast of Yt based on observations up to time t− 1.
Unlike a probability forecast that gives a predictive distribution of Yt as
in Gneiting and Raftery (2007), Yˆt|t−1 is a nonprobabilistic forecast that
predicts the value of Yt [see Wilks (2005), Section 7.3]. The score used by
Diebold and Mariano (1995) is of the form L(Yt, Yˆt|t−1) = g(et), and they
consider the average loss differential
∆ˆn = n
−1
n∑
t=1
{L(Yt, Yˆ ′t|t−1)−L(Yt, Yˆ ′′t|t−1)}(6.4)
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between two forecasts Y ′t|t−1 and Yˆ
′′
t|t−1,1 ≤ t ≤ n. Assuming a probability
measure Q under which dt := g(e
′
t) − g(e′′t ) is covariance stationary with
absolutely summable autocovariances γk so that f(0) :=
∑∞
k=−∞ γk/(2pi) is
the spectral density at frequency 0, they use the asymptotic normality of
∆ˆn under the null hypothesis H0 :EQ(dt) = 0 and a window estimate fˆ(0)
of f(0) so that the test statistic
√
n∆ˆn/(2pifˆ(0))
1/2 has a limiting standard
normal distribution under H0 as n→∞. This aysmptotic normality result,
however, requires additional assumptions, such as stationary mixing, which
they do not mention explicitly. Their work has attracted immediate attention
and spawned many subsequent developments in the econometrics literature
on this topic.
Giacomini and White (2006), hereafter abbreviated as G&W, review some
of the developments and propose a refinement ofH0 for which the asymptotic
normality of ∆ˆn can be established under precisely stated conditions that
can also allow nonstationarity. They formulate the null hypothesis of equal
predictive ability of two forecasting models or methods as “a problem of
inference about conditional expectations of forecasts and forecast errors that
nests the unconditional expectations that are the sole focus of the existing
literature.” The econometrics literature they refer to is primarily concerned
with “forecast models;” thus Q in the previous paragraph is the probability
measure associated with the forecast model being evaluated, or with a more
general model than the two competing forecast models whose predictive
abilities are compared.
G&W evaluate not only the forecasting model but also the forecasting
method, which includes “the forecasting model along with a number of
choices,” such as the estimation procedure and the window of past data,
used to produce the forecast. They consider k-step ahead forecasts, for which
Yˆt|t−1 is replaced by Yˆt|t−k, and assume that the forecasts are based on finite-
memory models involving unknown parameters, that is,
Yˆt+k|t = h(Yt, . . . , Yt−m+1,xt, . . . ,xt−m+1;β),(6.5)
where h is a known function, m is the order of the model, xt is a covariate
vector at time t and β is a parameter vector to be estimated from some
specified window of past data. Their formulation generalizes that of West
(1996) who considers regression models. Whereas West assumes that the
data are actually generated by the regression model with true parameter
β∗, G&W allow model misspecification, and therefore their assumptions
do not involve β∗. They consider two such nominal models, resulting in
the forecasts Yˆ ′t|t−k and Yˆ
′′
t|t−k that use the same covariates but different
estimates βˆ
′
t and βˆ
′′
t . Their null hypothesis
H0 :E{L(Yt, Yˆ ′t|t−k)−L(Yt, Yˆ ′′t|t−k)|Gt−k}= 0 a.s. ∀t≥ 1(6.6)
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seems to be stronger than EL(Yt, Y
′
t|t−k) = EL(Yt, Y
′′
t|t−k) ∀t considered by
Diebold and Mariano (1995) for the case k = 1. On the other hand, (6.6)
in the case k = 1 just says that L(Yt, Y
′
t|t−1)− L(Yt, Y ′′t|t−1) is a martingale
difference sequence under H0 so that the martingale central limit theorem
can be applied to derive the limiting χ2-distribution of G&W’s test statistics
under H0. Unlike Diebold and Mariano (1995) for the case k = 1, G&W do
not use test statistics of the form (6.4) and their test statistics involve more
complicated weighted sums of L(Yt, Yˆ
′
t|t−k)−L(Yt, Yˆ ′′t|t−k). These weights are
chosen to improve the power of the test and require additional mixing and
moment assumptions on (xt, Yt) given in their Theorems 1–3.
The methodology developed in Section 3 and its extension outlined in Sec-
tion 6.1 suggest an alternative approach to comparing econometric forecasts.
As in (6.4), we consider the average score difference
∆ˆn = n
−1
n∑
i=1
{L(Yt, Yˆ ′t )−L(Yt, Yˆ ′′t )},(6.7)
in which Yˆ ′t and Yˆ
′′
t are forecasts that are Gt−1-measurable. Since k-step
ahead forecasts of Yt are Gt−1-measurable for any k ≥ 1, the theory applies
to all k-step ahead forecasts of Yt, as illustrated in Table 1. Instead of hy-
pothesis testing, our approach is targeted toward estimating
∆n = n
−1
n∑
i=1
E{L(Yt, Yˆ ′t )−L(Yt, Yˆ ′′t )|Gt−1},(6.8)
in which E is with respect to the actual but unknown probability measure
P . Analogously to Theorem 2(i) for the case of binary Yi, we can apply the
martingale central limit theorem to establish the asymptotic normality of
∆ˆn −∆n. In many applications, one can make use of the bucket structure
of the type in Section 3.4 to estimate the asymptotic variance of ∆ˆn. In
particular, this structure is inherent in dynamic panel data in econometrics
and longitudinal data in epidemiology, which is beyond the scope of this
paper on forecasting probabilities of events and will be treated elsewhere.
Note that the bucket structure is only used in estimating the asymptotic
variance of ∆ˆn by (6.2), and that Theorem 5 and its extension outlined in
Section 6.1 imply that the variance estimate tends to be conservative if the
assumed bucket structure actually fails to hold.
7. Discussion. The average score n−1
∑n
i=1L(Yi, pˆi) measures the diver-
gence of the predicted probabilities pˆi, which lie between 0 and 1, from the
indicator variables Yi that can only have values 0 or 1. As noted by Lich-
tendahl and Winkler (2007), this tends to encourage more aggressive bets
on the binary outcomes, rather than the forecaster’s estima
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probabilities. For example, an estimate of 95% probability may lead to a
probability forecast of 100% for a higher reward associated with the indi-
cator variable Yi; see also Mason (2008), who gives an example in which a
forecaster is encouraged to give such “dishonest” forecasts. This difficulty
would disappear if one uses L to compare pˆi with the actual pi, rather than
with the Bernoulli(pi) random variable Yi. Because the pi are unknown,
this is not feasible and the importance of using a proper score L(Yi, pˆi) to
evaluate a probability forecast has been emphasized to address the issue
of dishonest forecasts. In Section 3.2 we have shown that it is possible to
use L(pi, pˆi)−L(pi, pˆ′i) for comparing two forecasters and to construct con-
fidence intervals of the average loss difference. A key idea underlying this
development is the linear equivalent of a loss function introduced in Sec-
tion 2. Schervish (1989), Section 3, has used a framework of two-decision
problems involving these loss functions to develop a method for comparing
forecasters. Our approach that considers L(pi, pˆ
′
i)−L(pi, pˆ′′i ) can be regarded
as a further step in this direction.
As noted in Section 3.5, an important assumption underlying statistical
inference in the verification of probability forecasts in meteorology is that
the forecast-observation pairs are independent realizations from the joint dis-
tribution of forecasts and observations. Although Mason [(2008), page 32]
has pointed out that this assumption cannot hold “if the verification score
is calculated using forecasts for different locations, or if both the forecasts
and observations are not independent temporally,” not much has been done
to address this problem other than using moving-blocks bootstrap [Mason
(2008), Wilks (2005)] because traditional statistical inference does not seem
to provide much help in tackling more general forecast-observation pairs.
The new approach in Section 3 can be used to resolve this difficulty. It uses
martingale theory to allow the forecast-observation pairs to be generated
by general stochastic systems, without the need to model the underlying
system in carrying out the inference. The treatment of spatial dependence
is also covered in Section 3.5, in which dependence of the events at Kt lo-
cations at time t is encapsulated in the highly complex joint distribution
of their generating probabilities pt,1, . . . , pt,Kt , which our approach does not
need to model in performing inference on forecast validation. Our viewpoint
in forecast evaluation is that one should try not to make unnecessary or arbi-
trary assumptions on the underlying data-generating mechanism, especially
in regulatory settings such as regulatory supervision of a bank’s internal rat-
ings models of loan default probabilities; see Section 3.4 and Lai and Wong
(2008). A convenient but incorrect data-generating model that is assumed
can unduly bias the comparison.
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